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Case t<o. 19129 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Respondent against Appellants 
ctsking the trial court to impress a Constructive Trust for his 
benefit upon certain real property standing in the name of the 
Appellants located in Washington County, Utah or in the alter-
native claiming adverse possession on the part of Respondent and 
against Appellants regarding said property. 
DISO'OSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. The Court submitted the 
11"1 i t "r to the jury on special interrogatories as follows and 
tile' iury <lnswered as follows (R. 48): 
( l) 
INTERHOGATORY NUMBER ONE: 
subject property to Wilford c1nd Virqin10 M. /\sht<in, w"s hJo 
deeding conditional upon \'l1lfo1d and Virq1n1<1 d,•,•clu 1'.J 1;1. F., 
one-half of the property to \'looclruff when Wood111ff':" mdrrt,il 
problems had ended? 
JURY'S ANSWER TO INTERROGATOEY NUMBER ONE: Yc"s. 
INTERROGATORY NUMBER TWO: Did ct relationship of c:on-
"""" 
fidence and trust exist between Frank, Wilford and VirgHna at 
the time of the deeding? 
JURY'S ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NUMBER TWO: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NUMBER THREE: Did Wilford and Virg1n1a 
breach this relationship of trust, if any of you so find, by 
failing or refusing to deed to Woodruff following his divore• 
from Edith in 1980 with the result that Wilford and Virg1n1a 
are thereby unjustly enriched? 
JURY'S ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NUMBER THREE: Yes. 
Based upon the findings of the jury on the special inter-
rogatories the Court entered Findings of Facts and Conclusionr 
of Law in conformance therewith (R. 49-54) and entered its 
judgement ordering the Appellants to Quit Claim the East 
of the subject property together with one-half of the water or. 
whole property to Respondent (R. 55-56). From a verdict and 
judgement for the Respondent the Appellants have appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the Supreme Court affirm UL' 
verdict and 1udgement entered in the· trial court. 
12 ) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent is the brother and brother-in-law of the 
r.1,t•c·l cants Woodruff dnd Virginia M. Ashton (T. 5). The Respondent 
.,nd P.p1•el.Lant ililford P.shton had an oluer brother named Frank 
A.;hton 1Jho died December 10, l'lE.8 (T. 5). Prior to the death of 
t·rank Ashton he owned a forty acre tract of real estate with two 
shares irrigation water in or about Hurricane, Washington 
County, State of Utah (T. 6), but sold twelve acres of that 
property to a third party leaving a balance of twenty-eight 
cicres plus the two shares of water standing in his name (T. 6) 
Prior to the death of Frank Ashton the Respondent helped him 
farm and place improvements on the subject property (T. 31, 32). 
In Addition, Frank had told the brothers' sister Agnes Connell, 
t:1at h,e planned to give the ;:iroperty to his younger brothers 
Wilford and Woodruff upon his death (T. 174, 175, 176). 
On Nmrer.1ber 18, 1968 Frank Ashton executed his Warranty 
Deed conveying title to the property to the Appellants as joint 
tenaants (EX. 
Frank Ashton was buried on December 13, 1968 (T. 32) and 
on the same day the Ashton fa.mily met for a family dinner at the 
hone of Appellant Wilford Ashton (T. 32, EX. P-40, P-41). At 
that time and place a conversation took place wherein the Appellant 
1·/1lford Ashton advised the family that he had received a deed to 
subject property from Frank a few days prior to his death 
•nd that he had promised Frank, in consideration of the conveyance, 
• l1dt as soon as the Res::iond·ent solved his marital problem with 
Edith, that he (Wilford) would convey the East half of 
tn" ;ub]ect prop2rt:• and 0:1e-half of the water rights to the 
R,·c;!HJnlic>nt (T. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175). 
I " 
In addition, the Appc.'1lc1nt \·iilfnrcl ih:it ''" ,,1 
as long dS the w.1s t(J qct_ ()Jl.__,-t1,1L1 <it i 
he should pay half of Frcrnk'" hurldl feces (T. 37) ',;1 11 :i , 11 , 
Respondent suLsequtcntly did (T. l8, EX. l'-22, l'-20). 
Subsequent to this m•·etinq th" Respondent \-io"cirul t 
Ashton became actively involved in cultivatino thee :;ub],ccr_ 
property (T. 41, 42, 43, 44, 75, 76, 77, 78, EX. P-9, P-S, µ_-
P-10, P-8, P-6) and placed improvements on the East half of 
the subject property which he considered to be his (T. 45, 46, 
In addition the two brothers Wilford and Woodruff met at one 
time and arrived at an agreement as to how the subject properc 
would be divided in accordance with Frank's wishes ( T. 4 9, s , 
52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, EX. P-30) and placed certain markings 
showing their proposed division (T. 54, 55, 56, 57, EX. P-3, p.: 
P-11). In addition during the fourteen years between the dea·· 
of Frank Ashton until the present law suit was filed the 
ent paid one-half of the property taxes on the subject proper'. 
and one-half of the water assessment on the subject property 
65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, EX. P-19, P-1, P-17, ,._ 
P-18, P-21). Also, he placed certain improvements on the ercc 
erty consisting of a new barn, a corral, a loading shute, sG• 
house and shed (T. 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86) and a pond and rc>sc. 
(T. 87, 88). 
During the passage of time the Respondent rn<ldt> rt•CJU'cc' 
the Appellants to convey to l11m his share of the sutJ]eCt l'r,-, 
but the Appellants refused to mdk,· s11ch '''1 lil t IL 
that the Respondt...:nt hdd not his mdrl 1_..Jl 
1,11 
1,1-, V'l f<e Fcl1th (T. 94, 95) 
In October of 1980 the marital relationship between Edith 
c;t1': U12 P.<espowl'-'nt WdS terminated by a Decree of Divorce (T. 95, 
% , L;X. P-15). Subsequent thereto the Respondent made request 
his brother to convey to Respondent the subject property, but 
A?pellant failed and refused to do so (T. 97, 98, 99, 100, 
101, 102, 103, :!.04). During all of the time herein mentioned 
one-half of the water originally belonging to Frank Ashton was 
used by the Respondent to irrigate his claimed half of the sub-
Ject real property (T. 106, 107). 
ARGUMENT 
POIFIT I: RESPONDENT MET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF IN PROVING 
A COtlSTRUCTIVE TRUST AGAINST APPELLANTS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY. 
The doctrine of Constructive Trust has been recognized 
by the law for many years. The following is a statement of the 
doctrine set forth in the RESTATEMEN'l' Of" •rttE LAW OF TRUSTS at 
section 45: 
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers 
it inter vivos to another in trust for a third person, but 
no memorandum properly evidencing the intention to create 
a trust is signed, and the transferee refuses to perform 
the trust, the transferee holds the interest upon a con-
structive trust for the third person, if, but only if, 
(a) the transferee by fraud, duress or undue in-
fluence prevented the transferor from creating an 
enforceable interest in the third person, or 
(b) the transferee at the time of the transfer was 
in a confidential relation to the transferor, or 
(c) the transfer was made by the transferor in con-
templation of death. 
In dddit1on Utah, for many years, has recognized the law 
( 5) 
dealing with Constructive Trusts und the Supn·rn·· C«iirt 
11_1) 
upheld Constructive Trusts itn['OS•"d Liy the Court; CilPtiL, 1,,, 
CARNESECCA (utah 1977) P. 2cl 708; liA\IS VS. JENSf:n (Ut1l, 
209 P. 2d 229; MATTER OF ESTATE OF HOCK (Utah 1982) 655 
To set up Constructive Trusts under the c1rcumstancec 
we are presently deuling with the following must exist: 
a) a confident_ial relationship and arrangement betw""' 
the parties to the arrangement must exist. 
b) There must be a conveyance of real estate to the 
Defendants. 
c) Facts showing breach of a confidence giving rise tG 
UllJUSt enrichment -c.o U1e Defendants. 76 AM. JUR. 2d 
Sect. 221 et Seq Trust. HAWKINS vs - PERRY et al (Utar 
1953) 253 P. 2d. 372 (see Haws vs. Jensen and Matter of 
Estate of Hock above); NIELSON vs RASMUSSEN (Utah 1976) 
P. 2d 5ll. 
An examination of the record in this case shows without 
being controverted that the Appellant Wilford Ashton made on 
agreement with his brother Frank that as soon as Woodruff so)v, 
his marital problems with Edith that Wilford would convey t1J 
Woodruff the East half of the subject property together with,_ 
appurtenant water right. The testimony of Woodruff Ashton, o'. 
Agnes Connell and of Gary Ashton is uncontroverted in this r-
In addition the fact that a conveyance of the real estatee tr' 
Frank Ashton, the deceased brother, to Wilford and V1rgin1n 
Ashton is uncontroverted. In addition it is uncontrovertd 
have failed to the dS dqret.:d. Also, .1 
([,) 
t<lt1onship existed in that the record is clear that Frank 
1\:;t1tun W<lS the brother anc brother-in-law of the Appellants 
anC. Virginia M .. Ashton. Further the Respondent Woodruff 
is d brother and brother-in-law of Frank, Wilford and 
Viryinia M. Ashton. There can be no suestion as to a confid-
In addition and as further support for the position of 
the Respondent the record clearly shows, without being controvert-
ed, that for a period of some fourteen years the Respondent went 
on the property, ciltivated it, improved it, and paid his share 
of the property tax and water assessments. In addition at one 
time Woodruff and Wilford entered into an agreement dividing the 
property. The record is uncontroverted as to this agreement and 
is further uncontroverted that the two brothers marked their 
division by a readily identifiable monument. 
The cases are legion wherein the Utah Supreme Court has 
stdted that it will not lightly over turn a jury verdict.. In 
addition the Utah Supreme Court stated in the MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
or HOCK, cited above as follows: 
"In our review of an equity case such as this, we will not 
disturb the trial courts findings of facts unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against it. We apply this 
standard of review in cases involving trusts which arise 
by operation of law and in which the standard of proof is 
one of clear and convincing evidence." (see HOCK above at 
page 1114; see also JE\"IELL v. HORNER, 12 Utah 2d 328, 
366 P. 2d 596 (1961). 
It is clear that the Plaintiff has met his burden of proof 
n1d th'" Appellants must fa.il in their claim that he hasn't. 
( 7) 
POINT II: TI!E TRIAL COURT DID NOT L:l\l< <1Pi'l,Y 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AGAINST VIRGINIA M ASHTIJN 
In point II of their arqument thee Ap[wl l ant'" ,ir._ 
claiming that even if the Court were to find <l C'on;,trw:t iv_-
against Appellant Wilford Ashton that it could not find 
structive Trust against Appellant Virginia M. Ashton as th·-·r,c 
no evidence that she made any agreement with the <lnd 
transferor Frank Ashton. This premise does not conform t_o Uca, 
law as set forth in the case of HAWKINS vs. PERRY (Utah 1953) 
253 P. 2d 372. In the Hawkins case, Hawkins, then a boy of s:,_. 
teen, gave his Uncle Alfred T. Perry money to purchase a home:· 
Perry's name with the understanding that as soon as Hawkins 
reached the age of majority Perry would convey the home to 
Hawkins. Title to the home was taken in the name of Perry anc 
wife Lorene. Subsequent thereto Alred and Lorene Perry ter-
minated their marriage by divorce and Lorene was awarded the 
subject home. Hawkins then sued Lorene to get the home bad 
alleging Constructive Trust. Lorene defended on the basis ther 
she was not a party to her husbands agreement with Hawkins 
therefore was not bound by it. Justice Crockett in speaking f, 
the Utah Supreme Court said in part as follows: 
"Any title which Lorene Perry could have acquired in 
this property, either by being named joint tenant p01-
chaser in the contract or by the divorce decree 
her Perry's interest must be derived through !um. Th'J 
his acts in connection with the acquisition of the pr·-·:-
erty are binding on her; she can not reap the benefit 
the favorable aspects of his conduct without beinrJ Lr·_,,., 
ed by that which is unfavorable." (See Hawkins at f'J'J' 
( 8) 
Justice Crockett went on to state briefly the position 
"f thto Utah Court regarding Constructive Trust. 
Equity imposes a constructive trust to prevent one from 
unjustly profiting through fraud or the violation of a 
duty under a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 
The Utah decision of Chadwick v. Arnold (34 Utah 84, 95 
r. 572) declares a trust ex maleficio (constructive 
trust) arises whenever a person acquired the legal title 
to property of another by means of an intentional false or 
fraudulent verbal promise to hold the same for a certain 
purpose, and, having thus obtained the title, retains and 
claims the property as his own." It is now well recognized 
that actual fraud is not necessary, but may be presumed 
where there is a relationship of confidence between the 
parties to a transaction and there are "other circumstances 
tending to show that some advantage had been taken by the 
doroinant party with a consequent abuse of confidence." 
In Haws v. Jensen 209 P. 2d 229, he wrote: 
" A constructive trust will be imposed even though at the 
time of the transfer the transferee intended to perform 
the agreement, and even though he was not guilty of undue 
influence in procuring the conveyance. The abuse of the 
confidential relation consists merely in the failure of 
the transferee to perform his promise." 
To this may be added, the confidential relation can also 
be abused by the primisor's allowing himself to get into 
a position where he cannot perform his promise. 
It is clear that the position of Appellant Virginia M. 
Ashton is the same as that of her husband Wilford and under the 
doctrine of the Hawkins case the Constructive Trust must be 
applied against her as well as her husband. 
POINT III: THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
APPELLANTS' EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY. 
An examination of the transcript of the trial procedings 
,_,Jnlffiencing at page 403 of the transcript will show that Appellants 
11,•d as Appellants' witness Mr. Lowry Snow, an attorney and 
dbstractor. Respondent's attorney stipulated as to Mr. Snow's 
I a\ 
qualifications as an expert attorney dncl clbslrdctor. Ill' ':t 
11 
became apparent the direction of <l line• uf quc:;t1on1ng thr" 
Appellants were taking with Mr. Snow, th 1e> Court, sud 
refused to allow counsel to continue his line of questioning. 
Counsel for Appellants therefore asked for permission to 
a prof er of proof outside the hear ins of the Jury, which regue,._ 
was granted. As counsel for Respondent understands the 
of proof, Appellants were at tempting to ask the witness to give 
his expert testimony as to the effects of the severance of a 
joint tenancy. Apparently the theory of Appellants' oounsel 
was that Wilford Ashton, by agreeing to the conditions imposed 
by Frank Ashton in making the subject conveyance had "severed" 
the joint tenancy prior to its creation and therefore 
M. Ashton, as a joint tenant, could not be bound by any 
ment Wilford had made. Because of the Court's refusal to allo> 
that line of testimony before the jury the Appellants claim 
reversable error. 
It is the position of the Respondent that the Court act2: 
correctly in refusing Mr. Snow's testimony as the same was 
irrelevant and immaterial in view of the fact that (1) you 
can not severe a joint tenancy prior to its creation and (2) 
prevailing Utah law as ennunciated in Hawkins v. Perry et aL 
supra, renders such testimony irrelevant in any event. Under 
the law as set forth in Hawkins, Virginia Ashton is bound b' 
the acts and promises of Wilford. 
It is respectfully submitted to the Court that th 1 
11 
court's refusal to allow the testimony of Mr. Snow does not 
(I tll 
constitute reversable error and in fact constitutes no error 
rt L cl l l. 
POINT IV: THERE WAS NO INCAPACITY OF ANY MAJOR PARTY 
WITNESS AT TRIAL AND THEREFORE i'lO ERROR. 
At the conclusion of the testimony, the Appellant 
Wilford Ashton apparently suffered some type of health problem 
and was taken to the hospital. He had already testified, and 
there was no further need for him at trial, nor was he re-called 
as a witness by any of the parties at trial. Counsel for 
Appellants requested the Court to explain to the jury what had 
happened, but the Court refused, and merely advised the jury 
that Mr. Wilford Ashton had been "excused". Appellants cite 
the Court's actions in this regard as reversable error. 
Counsel for Respondent knows of no law supporting Appel-
lants' contention. It would seem however, that the Court's 
actions in regard to this occurrence were proper in that it 
remained neutral regarding the same. If the Court had launched 
into a long explanation and dissertation regarding Mr. Wilford 
Ashton's health problems it could just as easily gotten the 
sympathy of the jury in favor of the Appellants and against the 
Respondent as the alternative of refusing to say anything could 
have worked the other way. It seems to the Respondent that the 
Court acted properly and that point IV of Appellants' claim of 
is not worthy of serious consideration. 
(11) 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted by Respondent lhdl the 
jury verdict and judgement of the tr1,\l court should be af-
firmed. 
84 770 
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